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PUBLIC GOODS V. PRIVATE RIGHTS: ANALYZING GOVERNMENT 
INEFFICIENCIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
Shannon Lea Watkins, B. Phil 
University of Pittsburgh, 2009
In this project, I describe the intergenerational nature of environmental public goods, and argue 
that the Supreme Court’s inconsistent doctrine of legal standing is as an obstacle to the 
enforcement of environmental laws that provide these public goods.  Public goods are goods that 
do not diminish as they are used or consumed and those that cannot be restricted in who 
consumes them, such as stable soil, an ecosystem, or clean air. 
Environmental public goods are particular in that they are intergenerational, meaning 
their provision is dependent upon consistent and long term commitment.  Although Congress has 
passed numerous statutes that protect environmental goods, the executing agencies are often 
unmotivated or unable to uphold these laws and provide these goods.  Though the courts offer a 
way for citizens to become involved in ensuring the consistency of an agency’s official 
commitment, the Supreme Court’s application of the standing doctrine poses three challenges to 
external actors seeking legal review.  An institutional difference between the private nature of 
the Court and the public nature of environmental legislation explains the challenges groups have 
in demonstrating standing under environmental protection laws.  These challenges are made 
increasingly difficult as the Court inconsistently applies this doctrine to limit access to rigorously 
demonstrated injuries felt by only a minority of the population.   
Finally, this paper proposes that by changing the definition of the injury or the injured, 
Congress can reconcile this public-private tension in a way that ensures access to the courts 
while meeting the Court’s standing requirements.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
“Our responsibility as life tenants is to make certain that there are wilderness values to 
honor after we have gone.” –Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas1 
 
"The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals." Chief Justice 
Marshall2 
 
In 1969, the Sierra Club sued the Secretary of the Interior, Rogers Morton, when the National 
Forest Service permitted the development of Mineral King Valley, part of Sequoia National 
Forest.  Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc. had won the permit, and planned to develop an enormous 
ski resort, including an access highway cutting through the valley.  In court, the Sierra Club 
argued that Walt Disney’s development “would destroy or otherwise affect the scenery, natural 
and historic objects and wildlife of the park and would impair the enjoyment of the park for 
future generations.”3  The District judge blocked the Disney development, but upon appeal both 
the Court of Appeals and then the Supreme Court found that the Sierra Club had not 
demonstrated how it or its members would be harmed by the development of the valley.  Justice 
Stewart, writing for the majority, explained, “[N]owhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the 
Club state that its members use Mineral King for any purpose, much less that they use it in any 
                                                 
1 William O Douglas, A Wilderness Bill of Rights (Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1965), 26. 
2 Marbury v. Madison,5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
3 Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U. S. 734 (1972).  
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way that would be significantly affected by the proposed actions of [Disney].”4  In other words, 
the Sierra Club failed to demonstrate that it had been “injured in fact” by the agency’s grant of 
the permit.  In order for the Sierra Club to be granted standing to make the argument that Mineral 
King Valley should remain a remote area of wilderness, the Club had to demonstrate that its 
members used the Valley to a significant extent and therefore would be injured by its 
development. 
Sierra Club v. Morton (1972) was significant to citizen efforts to protect natural entities 
such as rivers, valleys, and species.  In Sierra Club, the Supreme Court recognized that threats to 
intangible interests might be grounds for standing to sue, holding that “aesthetic and 
environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of 
life in our society.”5  These interests had only recently been recognized as justiciable,6 and the 
holding in Sierra Club allowed conservation-minded citizens who had been injured to have 
standing in court.7  After the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Sierra Club returned to the lower 
courts and presented a slew of members who hiked, fished, or otherwise spent time in Mineral 
King Valley who could demonstrate that the Disney development would actually harm their 
interests.  The citizens were able to demonstrate the required injury in fact.  Not interested in a 
lengthy environmental impact study, Disney withdrew the proposal.  In this way, Mineral King 
Valley has remained undeveloped, and hundreds of citizen suits have secured protection for 
natural entities since.   
                                                 
4 405 U.S. 735 (1972). 
5 405 U.S. 734 (1972).   
6 Data Processing Service Organizations 397 U.S. 154 (1970) citing Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 
F.2d 608, 616; Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 328, 334-340, 359 
F.2d 994, 1000-1006; Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203. 
7 For a detailed study of the dynamics of environmental legislation in the 1970s, see generally Lettie M. Wenner, 
The Environmental Decade in Court (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, (1982).  Notably, the Supreme Court 
was less favorable to environmental cases than were lower courts. 
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Still, the court’s denial of standing in Sierra Club v. Morton based on the “injury in fact” 
test exemplifies challenges that groups like the Sierra Club face when they seek judicial review 
of an agency action (like the Forest Service’s permit grant) that threatens environmental 
protection.  The court’s description of an aesthetic interest suggests a straightforward solution, as 
evidenced by the Sierra Club’s second, and successful, attempt to demonstrate standing.  But 
consider a case in which plaintiffs have visited and expressed that they wish to return to the 
habitat of a species that international agency action threatens.  How discrete must their injury be?  
Is the injury to their opportunity to view endangered species?  Must the plaintiffs have actual 
travel plans to the area, even though the immediate harm to the species will persist?  The 
Endangered Species Act clearly calls for the protection of endangered species, and the species is 
injured-in-fact.  But a plaintiff who failed to demonstrate how the agency action harmed her will 
not meet stricter criteria for standing.  Or, consider a case in which the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has refused to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new automotive vehicles.  
A group of citizens sues the EPA for refusing to perform a mandatory action under the Clean Air 
Act, arguing that the EPA is mandated to decide if greenhouse gases (GHGs) affect climate 
change and if so, to regulate emissions.  Even before the citizens testify, the citizens themselves 
must demonstrate that climate change exists, is caused at least in part by the emission of GHGs 
from automobiles, that climate change will injure them in an imminent way, and that the citizen’s 
injury would be at least partially redressed by EPA regulations.8           
Both of these instances were brought before the Supreme Court, in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife (1992) and Massachusetts v. EPA (2007), respectively. 9  In the first, the Court held that 
because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate their imminent return to the area where the species 
                                                 
8 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see Massachusetts v. EPA 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
9 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555 (1992).     
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were harmed, the plaintiffs did not have standing.10  In the second, none of the citizens were 
granted standing because each had failed to demonstrate how global warming would harm 
her/him more discretely than it would any other citizen.11  These cases elucidate potential 
problems that groups face when they bring suit to protect environmental public goods.  Consider 
the scenic view of Mineral King as a public good.  Disney wanted to build a ski resort (a private 
good) in the valley.  This threatened the scenic view (a public good).  Paradoxically, the scenic 
view would have to be rendered a private good before the Court would intervene to protect it.  
This paper elucidates this dilemma.   
Recognizing government’s failures in protecting environmental public goods, this paper 
is motivated by the question: why has government ineffectively provided environmental 
protection?  The answer is twofold.  First, although Congress has passed laws that protect 
environmental resources, the execution of those laws has been insufficient.  Second, although 
external actors can use the courts to compel the execution of the law, the courts have restricted 
access to this legal review.  The latter point is evident in the above examples, and is particularly 
significant because of the nature of environmental resources.   
To answer this question, I begin in Chapter 2.0 by describing public goods, explaining 
why government often serves as a mechanism for their provision, and the particular challenges to 
the provision of environmental public goods.  In Chapter 3.0 I demonstrate (a) that Congress has 
passed environmental legislation that protects certain environmental public goods and (b) that 
agency administration of environmental law has been insufficient to the provision of these goods.  
As is evident in Sierra Club, interest groups seek to use the Court’s power of judicial review to 
                                                 
10 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555 (1992).     
11  Mass v. EPA The citizens that sued were joined by Massachusetts and various other governments.  Massachusetts 
was the only party to be granted standing.  The merits of the case were heard, but because of Massachusetts’ 
standing, and not the standing of any citizen. 
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examine these agency actions.  However, as is also evident in Sierra Club, the Court’s doctrine 
of standing proves a challenge to groups bringing suit to protect these environmental public 
goods.  In Chapter 4.0 I identify three factors that explain why groups face particular challenges 
when bringing suit under environmental public goods legislation.  These are (a) the tension 
between public goods and private rights (b), the Court’s inconsistent application of “injury in 
fact” and (c), the Justices’ different emphasis on “adverseness.”  Finally, in Chapter 5.0, I 
propose two ways in which the legislature could change environmental protection in order to 
enable groups to obtain effective judicial review of agency action in regards to environmental 
legislation, by (1) changing the conception of “injury” and (2) by granting legal standing to the 
protected natural entities.   
         
 5 
2.0  ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC GOODS AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE 
COMMONS 
In order to understand government insufficiencies in environmental protection, it is 
necessary to recognize the nature of environmental resources.  Congressional statutes that 
provide environmental protection provide intergenerational environmental public goods.  Section 
2.1 describes public goods theory, and provide a taxonomy of environmental public goods.  
Section 2.2 explains the collective action problem that surrounds the provision of public goods.  
Section 2.3 elucidates the particular difficulties in providing environmental public goods.   
2.1 AN ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC GOODS TAXONOMY 
Historically, two criteria have been used to classify goods: rivalry and excludability.  A 
good is rival when consumption of the good by one limits consumption of the same good by 
another.  For instance, if I eat an orange, that orange is then unavailable to you.  A good is 
excludable when the benefits of the good can be restricted by its owner.12 For instance, if I 
choose not to share my guitar, no one else can play it.  A good that is both excludable and rival is 
identified as a private good.  If a craftsman makes a certain number of guitars, the number of 
                                                 
12 Scott H. Ainsworth, Analyzing Interest Groups: Group Influence on People and Policies (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2002) 15. 
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consumers is limited by the number of guitars made.  A good that is neither rival nor excludable 
is a public good – consumption of a public good by one cannot limit the consumption of that 
good by another, and access to the good cannot be limited as to prevent access by another.  For 
instance, my “consumption” of public radio does not limit anyone else’s consumption, and after I 
have purchased a radio, nothing prevents me from listening to National Public Radio (NPR).13   
Natural entities provide an array of goods.  Environmental private goods would include 
lumber, areas for energy development, water for private use, food, and a depository for toxic 
waste.  These are all goods that are rival in consumption and excludable in benefits.  Where one 
lumber company farms, another company can necessarily not.  One’s use of water for irrigation 
purposes necessarily reduces the amount of water available for her neighbor’s crops.   
The areas and entities that provide these private goods also provide many public goods, 
like stable soil for erosion prevention, a healthy watershed, a stable atmosphere, and an 
inspiration for wilderness values.  Consider a stable climate as an environmental public good 
(EPG).  When one citizen benefits from the stability of the climate, the stability of the climate 
does not change in response.  Each citizen can enjoy a stable climate simultaneously without 
affecting that stability.  A stable climate is thus non-rival and non-excludable.  Similarly, the 
stability of a watershed and of an ecosystem can be considered public goods.14  Integral to the 
stability of an ecosystem is the integrity of the biota, or the sum of the living organisms living 
within a given area.15  Biointegrity can therefore also be considered an environmental public 
                                                 
13 For an explanation of public goods theory and as it relates to environmental public goods, see Alkuin Koelliker, 
“Globalisation and National Incentives for Protecting Environmental Public Goods: Types of Goods, Trade Effects, 
and International Collective Action Problems,” in A Handbook of Globalisation and Environmental Policy ed. Frank 
Wijen, Kees Zoeteman, and Jan Pieters (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2005) 58. 
14 Integral to the stability of an ecosystem is the integrity of the biota, or the sum of the living organisms living 
within a given area.  Biointegrity can therefore also be considered as an environmental public good in the same vein 
as other stabilizing entities.   
15 David Sadava et al., Life: the Science of Biology, 8th ed. (USA, Sinauer Associates, Inc. 2008) 472. 
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good in the same vein as other stabilizing entities.16  These public goods—the stability of the 
climate, a watershed, or an ecosystem—are provided by forests, wilderness areas, or other 
natural areas.   
Tangible environmental public goods also provide intangible public goods.  Historical 
environmentalists like Aldo Leopold and John Muir maintained that wilderness areas were areas 
of immense freedom, promoters of intellectual diversity, and fundamental to American 
democracy. 17  Former Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas promoted a Wilderness Bill of 
Rights, arguing that although wilderness areas were physically only enjoyed by a few, wilderness 
values should be recognized by a diverse population.18  According to Douglas, even if a citizen 
does not or cannot visit a wilderness area, she finds a certain identity and comfort in the 
wilderness’ existence.  Fifty years later, Mark Sagoff argues that wilderness areas provide 
symbols of American nationality.19  Sagoff concludes “our obligation toward nature is an 
obligation toward the expressive qualities we value and feel toward nature.”20  Sagoff argues 
these expressive entities must be continually provided or the concept of those expressive 
qualities changes,21 and therefore, “one way to keep our concept of freedom intact is to respect 
the objects that express it.”22  It follows from these arguments that if one American finds comfort 
                                                 
16 Consider Edward O. Wilson, described in Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1982) 260.  See generally, Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich, The Dominant Animal: Human 
Evolution and the Environment (Washington, Island Press: 2008) and Amery B. Lovins, L. Hunter Lovins, and Paul 
Hawkin, “A Road Map for Natural Capitalism” Harvard Business Review May-June (1999) 146 who argue that 
ecosystems provide certain free environmental services available to all that are not reproducible by humans.    
17 Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) 204. 
18 William O Douglas A Wilderness Bill of Rights (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965) “Even though a wilderness is 
thought of in terms only of those who canoe or hike or backpack of ride horses or climb mountains, the values are 
important in our pluralistic society.” 86  “When it comes to wilderness we need a similar Bill of Rights to protect 
those whose spiritual values extend to rivers and lakes, the valleys and the ridges, and who find life in a mechanized 
society worth living only because those splendid resources are not despoiled” 87. 
19 Mark Sagoff, “On Preserving the Natural Environment,” Yale Law Journal 84 (1974). 
20 Ibid., 245. 
21 Ibid., 259. (“The destruction of symbols is a step toward ignorance of the qualities those symbols express.”)   
22 Ibid., 228. 
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in knowing the Grand Canyon is unblemished by the trappings of civilization, of course another 
American is able to appreciate the same free nature of the canyon.  Thus, the consumption of 
these symbols is non-rival and furthermore non-excludable.  Indeed, one’s appreciation for the 
canyon may be augmented as the canyon becomes a national symbol.    
Often goods are not easily identifiable as purely public or purely private.  Consider a 
town’s public square.  Any citizen or visitor to the town can use the square, and throughout the 
summer, many visitors do.  The carousel is broken and the lawn worn.  In the evenings, the quiet 
atmosphere is often disrupted by the chatting of visitors.  Consequently, a visitor who comes to 
the square on a late-summer evening does not enjoy the same green and peaceful square as does 
the first spring visitor.  In this example, consumption of the good is non-excludable, for access to 
the square was not restricted.  Consumption of the good is, however, rival; one visitor to the 
square affects the visit of another visitor.  A good that is rival in consumption but non-excludable 
can be called a common pool resource.23  Consider high-sea fisheries as a common pool 
resource—without international treaties, anyone can fish, but each catch reduces the pool.  On 
the other hand, a good that is excludable in consumption but non-rival within the consuming 
group is called a club good.24  The good is non-rival within a particular “club” of people.  
Consider cable television—no one who installs a cable box is interrupting another’s television 
viewing opportunities.  The benefits of cable television are available only to those who purchase 
the service, but once the service has been purchased, consumption is non-rival.  
Consider the goods taxonomy of a national park.  The stability of the soil, of the 
ecosystem, and of the climate are arguably pure public goods, but the park institution and land 
                                                 
23 Alkuin Koelliker, “Globalisation and National Incentives for Protecting Environmental Public Goods: Types of 
Goods, Trade Effects, and International Collective Action Problems,” in A Handbook of Globalisation and 
Environmental Policy ed. Frank Wijen, Kees Zoeteman, and Jan Pieters (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2005) 61. 
24 Ibid. 
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itself are not purely non-excludable and non-rival.  Because Yellowstone National Park does not 
currently have a quota system to limit the number of visitors, the roads are often subject to 
congestion, and increased visitation leads to widened trails, polluted air, disturbed wildlife, and a 
decrease in the wilderness and outdoor experience.  Access to the park is non-excludable, but 
consumption is somewhat rival, meaning that visitation is not limited and visitation by some 
disturbs visitation (consumption) by others.  The park, like other public lands, is an impure 
public good.25 
Table 1. Goods Taxonomy 
 
 
 Excludable Non-Excludable 
Rival Private Goods 
Timber 
Energy Development 
Furs 
Common Pool Resources 
Public Land 
Wild Fish Stock 
Non-Rival Club Goods 
Research and Development 
Public Goods 
Clean Air 
Stability—climate, biota, watershed 
                                                 
25 See generally, William Lowry, Preserving Public Lands for the Future: The Politics of Intergenerational Goods 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998).  
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2.2 THE RATIONAL ACTOR 
The value of a public good is necessary but not sufficient for citizens to take actions to 
protect it.26  As Mancur Olson argues in The Theory of Collective Action, no individual has an 
incentive to contribute to the provision of public goods.27  In The Tragedy of the Commons, 
Garrett Hardin demonstrates that it is wrong to assume that “decisions reached individually will, 
in fact, be the best decisions for an entire society.”28  He then describes the tragedy of a free 
commons in which no individual has an incentive to protect the public good of the commons.  
An example commons is the public square in section 2.1, or Yellowstone National Park.  The 
tragedy unfolds in this way: imagine a given pasture is common to all shepherds in the area.  The 
commons is large enough to sustain one sheep per shepherd.  Any sheep added above this 
number will reduce the viability of the field.  Each shepherd wants to maximize her gain, and so 
she compares (a) the utility of adding one sheep to the field to (b) the damage done to the field 
that she will experience.  The utility to the shepherd is 1 for each additional sheep that she will 
add, and she only experiences a loss of utility a tiny fraction of -1.  This loss is much smaller 
because the overgrazing affect that single sheep has will be divided among all of the shepherds.  
The rational shepherd concludes that it is in her best interest to continually add sheep to the field.  
Each rational shepherd reaches this conclusion—the tragedy is that each shepherd is “locked into 
a system that compels [her] to increase [her] herd without limit—in a world that is limited.”29  
Thus, Hardin concludes, “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”30  He explains that for 
                                                 
26 Alkuin Koelliker, “Globalisation and National Incentives for Protecting Environmental Public Goods, 57. 
27 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971).  
28 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons”  Science,162  December 13, 1968, 1244. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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pollution, the rational interest is putting something into the commons that alters the nature of the 
commons.  The tragedy here is that, “[Every] rational man finds that his share of the cost of the 
wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before 
releasing them.”31   
Hardin argues that each user of a public commons has a strategic interest in exploiting the 
commons.   
Author David Humphreys argues that neither unregulated use nor private ownership of 
the forest commons promotes conservation because they focus on the short term and the market.  
This is because the short-term rewards of market-based mechanisms “tend to generate only those 
forest private goods with monetary value that can be traded for profit.”  They are unable to 
“capture the full public goods value of forests and thus [market mechanisms] promote a 
reductionist view of forests.”32 
Hardin, Olson, and Humphreys argue that rational actors have incentive to take actions 
that are beneficial in the short term.  In the tragedy of the commons, we see that these rational 
actions undermine the maintenance of the commons.  In order to protect the commons, or 
provide other public goods, citizens need to collectively agree to take certain actions.  The 
community of shepherds could collectively agree to limit each’s flock to one sheep.  Humphreys 
describes the common nature of forests, and how outside interests can undermine the balance of 
communal checks in the maintenance of a commons.  He argues that Hardin’s argument is a 
convincing explanation of the dynamics of use (of a commons) when access is not restricted by 
communal rights or rules (or the rules are broken.)    
                                                 
31 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons.” 
32 David Humphreys, Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance (London: Earthscan, 2006) 14. 
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An external institution can often solve the collective action problem by coercing rational 
actors to protect the commons.33  The government often serves as this coercive force.  In regards 
to environmental public goods, the government passes regulations that restrict actions that would 
harm the environmental commons.  Even though a state does not only provide public goods—for 
instance military contracts are private goods awarded by the state— “a state is first of all an 
organization that provides public goods for its members.”34  For example, the military contracts, 
private goods, are awarded in order to secure military protection, which is a public good.  Hardin 
argues that administrative law can legislate temperance in a way that can protect environmental 
commons.35  Humphreys also concludes that administrative law is necessary to the provision of 
environmental public goods.  The focus of this paper is on those environmental public goods that 
the government legally protects.     
2.3 THE SPECIAL DILEMMA WITH EPGS 
Before examining the government’s role in the provision of environmental public goods, 
it is necessary to identify several characteristics of EPGs that make them particularly challenging 
to provide.  First, the same forests or wilderness areas can provide both private and public goods.  
As the nature of the good changes, the group that benefits from it does as well.  The recipients 
include the private lumber company, the local citizenry, and the global population that benefits 
                                                 
33 Hardin, 1245. 
34 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, 15. Scott H. Ainsworth, Analyzing Interest Groups: Group 
Influence on People and Policies (New York : W.W. Norton & Company, 2002) 16.  He also notes that states are 
not the only entities that provide public goods. 
35 Hardin, 1245. 
 13 
from the forest’s contributions to a stable climate.36  Those who live near a forest benefit from 
the water purification, watershed stability, and recreation opportunities that the forest provides.  
Citizens that live in another country may not visit the forest and thus not benefit from these 
goods.  The global citizens still benefit from its carbon capture and purification of the air.    
The provision of public goods for the benefit of one citizenry will alter the nature of the 
other goods, and often constrain the availability of a private good.  This makes solving the 
collective action problem more difficult.  If a forest is designated as wilderness by the 
government, the private good of lumber is no longer available.  EPGs are only available to “use” 
when they remain “unused” in a traditional sense of raw materials consumption.  This creates 
clear conflict between consumers of environmental private goods and consumers of public 
goods, evidenced by the conflict in Sierra Club v. Morton.  A forest does not only prevent 
erosion and capture carbon, but it potentially offers lumber or farm land.  In order to provide 
wilderness recreation, there can be no ski resort.   
A second characteristic that makes environmental public goods especially challenging to 
provide is that these goods are intergenerational in nature.  This means their provision is 
dependent upon continual collective action.  Dr. William Lowry identifies three factors that are 
necessary (though not sufficient) to the governmental provision of intergenerational goods.  
These factors are consistent public support for the good, political stability, and an official 
commitment by the providing government.   
  If a president was particularly anti-public radio and his/her appointee did not provide the 
public funding for National Public Radio, the public good would no longer be provided.  But, if 
such a president was succeeded by a public radio supporter, the first president’s anti-public radio 
                                                 
36 David Humphreys, Logjam 4. 
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policy could be easily remedied with new funds.  A similar situation does not hold for 
environmental public goods.  A clear-cut forest cannot regenerate on inauguration day.  Neither 
can the bonding properties of Ozone depleting compounds disappear, nor can the ice caps 
refreeze simply because of new agency commitment.  Environmental protection efforts need 
only fail once for depletion of the intended public good to occur, potentially for generations.  
   It cannot be assumed that the government will be an able provider of intergenerational 
public goods.  In the following chapter, I demonstrate how government environmental protection 
is subject to short-term influences and therefore is ineffective.     
 15 
3.0  EPGS LEGISLATION AND ITS INSUFFICIENT EXECUTION 
“Any decision against development can always be overturned later by a new law, a new policy, 
or a new mood in the country.  Preserving national treasures such as Yellowstone, the Grand 
Canyon, the redwoods, or Alaskan lands may be a temporary expedient.  As long as a parcel of 
land goes undeveloped, the potential for a change in government policy exists.”37 
 
In this chapter I demonstrate that, although Congress has recognized the government’s 
responsibility for the continual provision of certain EPGs, political appointments to agency 
administration have lead to inconsistent application and execution of these environmental 
protection laws, and therefore, insufficient commitment to the protect of environmental public 
goods.  Statutes that protect environmental public goods theoretically solve the collective action 
problem.  By regulating environmentally damaging activities, these statutes compel citizens, 
businesses, and the government itself to protect environmental public goods.   
3.1 COLLECTIVE ACTION BY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  
Shortly after the creation of Yellowstone National Park (1872), Cinnabar and Clark Fork’s 
Railroad Company attempted to secure a right-of-way across the park.  Supporters of the 
development argued that hallowed American values centered on the accumulation of property 
                                                 
37 Lettie M. Wenner, The Environmental Decade in Court (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982) 173-174. 
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and commercial enterprise.  In a 107 to 65 vote, the House of Representatives rejected the 
railroad’s application.  In describing the floor debate, historian Roderick Nash asserts that “never 
before had wilderness values withstood such a direct confrontation with civilization.”38  Indeed, 
this debate centered around Yellowstone’s purpose—should it be a park that primarily protects 
environmental public goods, or should it foremost encourage tourism and development?  As 
evidenced by this anecdote, society does not recognize all public goods as significant enough to 
be provided.39  Since this early debate over Yellowstone, Congress has passed numerous statutes 
that protect certain environmental public goods.  Theoretically, these statutes solve the collective 
action problem that surrounds the provision of EPGs.  An examination of these statutes reveals 
language that considers the intergenerational nature of public goods.  The statutes define the 
public goods they intend to provide, recognize the government’s role in their provision, and 
affirm an intergenerational commitment to their provision.   
The passage of the Wilderness Act in the middle of the century demonstrates Congress’s 
acknowledgement of government’s necessary commitment to the provision of certain 
environmental public goods.  The passage of environmental protection statutes does not, 
however, signify Congressional consensus, and therefore does not imply that these protections 
will ensure the protection of these goods.  For example, the debate regarding the Wilderness Bill 
involved seven years, nine separate hearings, more than six thousands pages of testimony, and 
sixty-six re-written submissions.40  According to Nash, the strongest opposition to the bill was a 
fear that a wilderness system would be too rigid and inflexible.  Nash summarizes the defense of 
the bill in the significant words of David Brower, founder of the Sierra Club: “the wilderness we 
                                                 
38 Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) 114-115. 
39 David Humphreys, Logjam: Deforestation and the Crisis of Global Governance (London: Earthscan, 2006) 2.   
 (“society plays a role in determining what is important enough to be provided as a public good.”) 
40 See Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind  222. 
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now have is all…men will ever have.”41  A wilderness system must be rigid in order to ensure 
intergenerational provision.  Since this early debate, conflict between short-term pursuits and the 
long-term provision of intergenerational environmental goods continued, but in that time, 
congress passed a wealth of statutes that protect environmental public goods.   
The maintenance of these statutes is important to the continual protection of EPGs.    
The statutory language defines the environmental public goods the Government 
recognizes as important to provide.  For instance, the “Purpose” of the Clean Air Act (CAA) is 
“to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources.”42  The Act recognizes the 
importance of biological diversity, and includes a research program that evaluates “the effects of 
air pollution on forests, materials, crops, biological diversity, soils, and other terrestrial and 
aquatic systems exposed to air pollutants.”43  The first provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA) 
also recognizes the Government’s role in the maintenance of system integrity: “the objective of 
this Act is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's 
waters.”44  The Marine Mammals Protection Act (MMPA) places the health and stability of the 
marine ecosystem as the primary reason for the protection of endangered marine species.  The 
MMPA asserts that species and population stocks in danger of extinction “should not be 
permitted to diminish beyond the point at which they cease to be a significant functioning 
element in the ecosystem of which they are a part.”45  These passages demonstrate the 
representation of the public health and the importance of a healthy biosphere and balanced biota.  
                                                 
41 Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind 223. 
42 Clean Air Act § 101 (b)(1) 
43 Clean Air Act § 103 (e)(5) 
44 Clean Water Act §101 (a) [33 U.S.C. 1251] 
45 The Marine Mammals Protection Act § 2 (6), 2(2)  16 U.S.C. 1361 
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Along with biological diversity or integrity, environmental protection statutes also 
recognize the diverse aesthetic and recreational goods a healthy environment can provide.  The 
MMPA describes the anthropocentric concerns regarding marine mammal protection: “[M]arine 
mammals have proven themselves to be resources of great international significance, esthetic and 
recreational as well as economic, and it is the sense of the Congress that they should be protected 
and encouraged to develop to the greatest extent feasible commensurate with sound policies of 
resource management.”46  A wilderness, as defined by the Wilderness Act (1964), “has 
outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation” and 
“may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or 
historical value.”47  The Act recognizes the character of wilderness, referring to it as a 
“resource,” and specifying any use should leave these areas “unimpaired for future use and 
enjoyment as wilderness” (emphasis added). 48  The statute further provides that, “wilderness 
areas shall be devoted to the public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, 
conservation, and historical use”49 (emphasis added).  This statute provides that these 
opportunities are more important than the private goods uses of these wilderness areas.  The 
following substantiates the Act’s promotion of public goods over private pursuits: “Except as 
specifically provided for in this Act, and subject to existing private rights, there shall be no 
commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this 
Act” (emphasis added).50  The only private rights recognized in declared wilderness areas are 
those already established, and the Act bans all commercial enterprise.  Furthermore, it severely 
                                                 
46 The Marine Mammals Protection Act § 2 6 
47 The Wilderness Act §2(c)(2) and (c)(4) 
48 The Wilderness Act, Section 2(a)  (16 U.S. C. 1131-1136) 
49 The Wilderness Act §4(b) 
50 The Wilderness Act §4(c) 
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limits any temporary structure or motorized vehicle use to those necessary for concerns of health 
and safety.51     
The opening language of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) of 1969 
also recognizes EPGs.  NEPA reveals that the public benefits of broad environmental protection 
are “safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings.”52  
Significantly, NEPA recognizes environmental benefits beyond recreational, aesthetic and 
cultural, asserting that environmental quality is necessary to “the overall welfare and 
development” of man (emphasis added).53  It implies that a healthy environment is necessary to 
the “social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations.”54  The MMPA 
provides that the integrity of the ecosystem is essential to a productive economy: “the protection 
and conservation of marine mammals and their habitats is therefore necessary to insure the 
continuing availability of those products which move in interstate commerce.”55  The 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) recognizes the “esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, 
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people” of endangered or threatened 
species of fish, wildlife, and plants.56  As established, these goods provided by diverse species 
are public goods.  The Act further recognizes the government’s role in protecting endangered 
                                                 
51 The Wilderness Act §4(c) 
52 NEPA §101(b) (“assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing 
surroundings;”) 
53 NEPA §101(a) “The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all 
components of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of population growth, high-density 
urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and 
recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare 
and development of man, declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with 
State and local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and 
measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general 
welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill 
the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.” (emphasis added) 
54 NEPA §101(a) 
55 MMPA §2 5(B) 
56 Endangered Species Act §1531 (a)(c) 
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species, the Act’s “Purpose” reading: “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which 
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for 
the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species, and to take such steps as 
may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in subsection 
(a) of this section.” The Act sets up specific roles for the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce, 
and federal agencies.57  Consider the proscriptive language here: “Each Federal agency shall, in 
consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, 
funded, or carried out by such agency…is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species or threatened species.”58  
The statutes themselves protect public goods, and furthermore, the language articulates 
the importance of government provision of these goods.  In the Clean Air Act, Congress found 
that “Federal financial assistance and leadership is essential for the development of cooperative 
Federal, State, regional, and local programs to prevent and control air pollution”59 (emphasis 
added).  Arguably, in this instance the government is solving the collective action problem 
surrounding the provision of clean air.  Significantly, several statutes include language that 
demonstrates congressional consideration of the intergenerational needs of environmental 
protection, and the government’s role in providing that continued official commitment.  In 
NEPA, the language suggests recognition of the intergenerational nature of environmental public 
goods, enlisting each generation “as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations,”60 
and declaring that, “it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government…to maintain 
                                                 
57 See, for example, ESA §1536 
58 ESA §1536 
59 Section 101 (a)(4) 
60 NEPA §101(b) 
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conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony” (emphasis added).61  
The Wilderness Act articulates the competition between private and public consumption of 
environmental goods, and through the passing of the statute, recognizes the Government’s role in 
protecting the public good: 
In order to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by expanding settlement and 
growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas within the United States and 
its possessions, leaving no lands designated for preservation and protection in their natural 
condition, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to secure for the American 
people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness 
(emphasis added). 62   
The statute is clear that the character of wilderness is to be preserved for enjoyment of that 
character by present and future generations.  NEPA requires consideration of long-term 
productivity in potentially environmentally damaging pursuits. 63  Significantly, NEPA provides 
that “The Federal Government shall…recognize the worldwide and long-range character of 
environmental problems” and furthermore “maximize international cooperation in anticipating 
and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world environment” (emphasis added).64  
These global and long-range environmental problems can be similarly labeled threats to global 
and long-range environmental public goods. 
Significant to the following discussion in Chapter 4.0 the above statutes protect third 
parties.  Although they recognize the anthropocentric reasons for environmental protection, they 
                                                 
61 NEPA §101(a) 
62 The Wilderness Act, Section 2(a)   (16 U.S. C. 1131-1136) 
63 Section 102 C (iv)  see also¸ the Clean Air Act (Section 103 (d)(1) (“The Administrator, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall conduct a research program on the short-term and long-term effects 
of air pollutants, including wood smoke, on human health.”) and Section 103 (e) (“[T]he Administrator, in 
cooperation, where appropriate, with the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, the Director of 
the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Secretary of Agriculture, shall conduct a research program to improve 
understanding of the short-term and long-term causes, effects, and trends of ecosystems damage from air pollutants 
on ecosystems.) 
64 Sec. 102 [42 USC § 4332]. 
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recognize no rights or legal interests of the citizens.  The public goods that the statutes protect 
receive no rights or legal interests.   
3.2 INCONSISTENCY OF OFFICIAL COMMITMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
PUBLIC GOODS 
Despite statutory commitments to the provision of intergenerational EPGs, it cannot be assumed 
that the government will be an able provider of these public goods.  As Dr. William Lowry has 
demonstrated, the stability of the political system, continual public support for the good, and a 
consistent, official commitment to that good’s provision are three necessary factors to the 
government’s provision of intergenerational environmental goods.  The often short-term focus of 
the government conflicts with the long-term dedication needed to protect EPGs.  Congressional 
support is difficult to maintain65 and furthermore, the appointed leadership of the American 
bureaucracy threatens the consistent agency dedication to the provision of intergenerational 
EPGs. 66  For an agency to be effective in its provision of intergenerational goods, it must be 
divorced from partisan politics and consistently exercise scientific expertise.  Career civil 
servants are motivated for several reasons to provide intergenerational goods.67  However, the 
top bureaucratic leadership is often motivated by shorter-term concerns; appointments are made 
                                                 
65 See Anwar Hussain and David N. Laband. “The Tragedy of the Political Commons: Evidence from U.S. Senate 
Roll Call Votes of Environmental Legislation,” Public Choice 124:3/4 (Sept. 2005) in which authors demonstrate 
that Senators are “significantly less likely to vote pro-environment when the costs are largely internalized to his state 
than when the costs are externalized to other states. 359 
66 William R. Lowry, Preserving Public Lands for the Future: the Politics of Intergenerational Goods (Washington 
DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998) 53.  Note that Chapter 3 is titled United States: Political Reality vs. 
Scientific Desire 
67 William R. Lowry, Preserving Public Lands for the Future 11. 
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in accord with political expediency and politicians can continue to exercise influence in agency 
decisions.68   
It is important to note that agencies have extensive authority over implementation of 
statutes.  A lack of resources often influences which projects and regulations an agency chooses 
to pursue.69  Furthermore, the Court grants a considerable amount of deference to agency actions 
and interpretations of statutes.  In all of these instances, there are opportunities for experts to 
exercise scientific discretion, and for political appointees to assert conflicting influence. 
Political appointments to agency leadership demonstrably affect the integrity of agency 
environmental commitments.  Under President Ronald Reagan and President George H.W. Bush 
and President George W. Bush, political appointees to positions that dictated environmental 
policy were often interested in changing the focus of their agencies and favored business 
interests above those of science.  The most demonstrative case in which a political appointee 
threatened to and did in fact dramatically alter the management of public goods was that of 
Reagan’s appointment of James Watt of Secretary of the Interior.  Previously head of the 
Mountain States Legal Foundation, a foundation that specialized “in opposing the Departments 
of Interior and Agriculture in their efforts to conserve natural resources on public lands,”70 
Secretary Watt was adamantly pro-development at the cost of environmental public goods.  Data 
collected from government scientists during the administration of George W. Bush provides 
further evidence that political forces can undermine the consistency of an official commitment.  
From 2005-2007, the Union of Concerned Scientists surveyed government scientists at seven 
                                                 
68 William R. Lowry, Preserving Public Lands for the Future 53. 
69 David R. Hodas, in “Standing and Climate Change: Can Anyone Complain About the Weather?” Land Use and 
Environmental Law 451 (1999-2000) concludes that, given the choices agencies will have to make, “some sort of 
citizen suit enforcement will be necessary” 453-454. 
70 Lettie M. Wenner The Environmental Decade in Court 55.  Because of his controversial policy decisions, Watt 
was forced to resign several years later. 
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agencies and the EPA.  The survey reveals that 60 percent of respondent climate scientists (1,028 
scientists) had personally experienced interference with their work, and 213 scientists reported 
that they had been directed to “provide incomplete, inaccurate, or misleading information” to the 
public.71  Not only were scientists encouraged to doctor information to justify decisions, but 
agency decisions were sometimes influenced by non-agency individuals.  For example, 49 
percent of respondents at the EPA “knew of many or some cases in which political appointees at 
other federal agencies were inappropriately involved in the EPA’s decisions.”72  Furthermore, 
many scientists suggested “that political interference is compromising the ability of their 
agencies to protect the environment and public health.”73  The report found that:  
“522 EPA scientists (33 percent of respondents) disagreed that the EPA was acting 
effectively to ‘clean up and/or mitigate existing pollution or environmental problems.’  
378 FDA scientists (39 percent) disagreed that the ‘FDA is acting effectively to protect 
public health.’  285 FWS scientists (69 percent) disagreed that the FWS is acting 
effectively to preserve endangered or threatened species.”74  
Evident from these first hand testimonies, the political dependence of the regulating agencies can 
undermine the missions of those agencies.   
Based on the above evidence, it is insufficient to argue that a change in government 
attitude or ethic toward the environment will sufficiently alter the course of government 
conservation and ensure the provision of intergenerational goods.  This is because there is no 
guarantee that the next elected official will be consistent in dedication to that provision.  The 
                                                 
71 Union of Concerned Scientists “Voices of Federal Scientists” (accessed 29 May 2009)  
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/Voices_of_Federal_Scientists.pdf  
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
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dedication to organizational effectiveness of William D. Ruckelshaus, the first EPA Agency 
Administrator, did not prevent Reagan from appointing a corporate lawyer to dismantle the 
program, and President Reagan’s policies did not prevent President George H.W. Bush from 
again changing the direction of the EPA.75   
3.3 CONCLUSION  
Institutions, like the government, often solve collective action problems by serving as external 
enforcement mechanisms.  Congress has passed numerous statutes that establish rules and 
regulations to protect environmental goods, in so doing, theoretically solving the collective 
action problem surrounding the provision of those goods; however, the intergenerational nature 
of environmental public goods makes provision and protection dependent upon consistent 
executive commitment, independent of the electoral calendar.  The agencies charged with 
enforcement of these laws are often unmotivated to provide these goods.   
Just as Congress provided an external institution to solve the collective action problem 
surrounding environmental public goods, groups and individuals can serve as compelling forces 
to maintain the provision of these goods.  The courts offer one way for the citizens to become 
involved in ensuring the consistency of an agency’s official commitment.  Groups get involved 
with the judicial branch in several ways, including becoming plaintiffs of their own.  Not only 
can a court compel the involved agency to act legally, but a case can incite future compliance.76  
                                                 
75 Anne Gorsuch Burford was appointed by President Ronald Reagan to head the EPA only to resign after 22 months 
for being found in contempt of Congress.  Ruckelshaus was then asked to return to the agency. 
76 Kevin A. Coyle “Standing of Third parties to Challenge Administrative Agency Actions” California Law Review 
76:5 (Oct., 1988) 1102. 
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In environmental public goods legislation, Congress has even provided for citizen-suits to 
challenge agency actions under said statutes.  But, as I will demonstrate in the following section, 
the court’s parameters regarding who can bring their case to court have aggravated congressional 
and citizen efforts to hold agencies accountable to the laws that govern them.   
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4.0  PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: “STANDING” CHALLENGES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PLAINTIFFS  
As established above, execution of EPG legislation has been insufficient in providing EPGs.  
Interest groups are able to encourage government provision of EPGs by gaining access to 
Congresspersons, the administrating agencies, and the courts.  Interest groups can become 
involved in judicial proceedings in several ways, including by filing amicus curie (friend of the 
court) briefs, by lobbying for or against judicial nominees, and by suing as a plaintiff in their 
own right.77  This chapter focuses on this third method of group participation—specifically 
bringing suit against government agencies.  This particular method of group participation is 
interesting because, although Congress has facilitated groups in this regard, recent holdings by 
the Supreme Court have restricted the access groups have to bring suit.  In order for a group (or 
association) to have standing, at least one member of the group must have standing apart from 
the group.78  Without standing, groups are unable to have the court review agency actions that 
threaten the provision of EPGs.       
                                                 
77 Jeffrey M. Berry and Clyde Wilcox, The Interest Group Society, Fifth Ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2009) 
146-152. 
78 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n  432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
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4.1 CITIZEN SUITS 
Congress considered citizen-suits as an important way to ensure that environmental laws were 
upheld.79  All but one environmental protection statute (along with the Administration Procedure 
Act) include a provision under which citizens are granted standing to obtain judicial review of 
agency action in violation of the statute. 80  These “citizen-suit” provisions give opportunities for 
citizens to sue agencies because of construction of rules, regulations, or failure to enforce part of 
the statute.  If a statute provides a plaintiff a right to sue it is often referred to as a “private right 
of action.”  At times this phrase refers only to this particular statutory grant to sue, and other 
times its use includes the right to challenge administrative action granted under 10(a).  Either 
way, a plaintiff can bring suit under the provision. 81 
The Clean Water Act provides that:  
“any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-- (1) against any person 
(including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or 
agency… who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under 
this Act or (b) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a 
standard or limitation, or (2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of 
                                                 
79 See, for instance, Friends of the Earth v. Carey 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2nd Cir. 1976) (“Congress made clear that 
citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers but rather as welcomed participants in the 
vindication of environmental interests. Fearing that administrative enforcement might falter or stall, the citizen suits 
provision reflected a deliberate choice by Congress to widen citizen access to the courts, as a supplemental and 
effective assurance that the Act would be implemented and enforced.” (internal citations removed) and “The Senate 
Committee responsible for fashioning the citizen suit provision emphasized the positive role reserved for interested 
citizens: ‘Government initiative in seeking enforcement under the Clean Air Act has been restrained. Authorizing 
citizens to bring suits for violations of standards should motivate governmental agencies charged with the 
responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings.’”) 
80 See e.g. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1); 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a); Marine Mammals Protection, Research and 
Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. (g)(1); Deepwater Port Act, 33. U.S.C. § 1515(a); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
300(j-8)(a); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911(a); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a); Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 
43 U.S.C. § 1349(a); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). 
81 See Cetacean Community v. Bush  
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the Administrator to perform any act of duty under this Act which is not discretionary 
with the Administrator” (emphasis added).82   
The CWA provides broad standing.  Other provisions are more specific.  In Sierra Club v. 
Morton, the Sierra Club based their argument for standing on a statutory provision in the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) reads 
“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by 
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”83  
Data Processing recognized the grant of standing in the APA to be broad.   
Legal scholars recognize these provisions as a Congressional hedge against bureaucratic 
failure to uphold the statutes.84  The inclusion of these provisions attests to the role that groups 
play in ensuring agency provision of EPGs.  However, the court has held that these citizen suit 
provisions are insufficient to a group’s standing.  In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), the 
Court rejected Defenders of Wildlife’s claim of a procedural injury.  The Endangered Species 
Act provides that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to enjoin any 
person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . 
who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter."85  The District Court held that 
the ESA citizen-suit provision conferred a procedural right to consultation upon all citizens.  The 
Supreme Court rejected this view of procedural rights, and held that procedural rights can only 
be claimed if the failure to follow that procedure threatens a concrete interest of the plaintiff.  
One legal scholar has referred to Lujan as “a virtual death knell for citizen-suits in US Federal 
                                                 
82 Section 505 of CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) 
83 Administrative Procedures Act 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
84 See Stephen Lanza, “The Liberalization of Article III Standing: The Supreme Court’s Ill-Considered Endorsement 
of Citizen Suits in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services Inc.,” Administrative Law Review 52:4 
(2000) 1454 and notes 50-51, citing, for example, “Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(‘Congress made clear that citizen groups are not to be treated as nuisances or troublemakers but rather as welcomed 
participants in the vindication of environmental interests.’)”. 
85 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) 
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courts.”86  In what follows, I explain why the doctrine of standing renders these statutory grants 
of standing impotent, and furthermore, I identify three factors that determine if a group will have 
standing to seek judicial review of agency actions that violate EPG legislation.   
4.2 STANDING: DETAILS AND DEVELOPMENT 
In order to understand the significance of the courts’ current doctrine of standing, it is first 
necessary to understand the details and development of that doctrine.  The status of the US 
doctrine of standing has been called “one of the less enviable aspects of our judicial system.”87  
Indeed, the current doctrine derives not from either English or early American history, but from 
the early part of the twentieth century.88  “Standing” is often criticized for having little or no 
constitutional foundation,89 for being a tool of the judiciary to further personal political values, 
and for restricting otherwise legitimate plaintiffs from access to the court.90  Justice Scalia has 
                                                 
86 Matt Handley “Why Crocodiles, Elephants, and American Citizens Should Prefer Foreign Courts: A Comparative 
Analysis of Standing to Sue” The Review of Litigation 21:1 (Winter 2002) 98.     
87 Ibid., 100. 
88 See Cass Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? (“But we will see that the modern understanding of standing is 
insufficiently self-conscious of its own novelty, even of its revisionism 170) See Stephen Lanza, “The Liberalization 
of Article III Standing” 1452 citing Stark v. Wickard 321 U.S 288, 309-310  (1944) as the Court’s “first mention of 
standing as a limitation on judicial power to entertain certain ‘cases and controversies.’”  
89 See Cass Sunstein, “Standing Injuries,” The Supreme Court Review (1993) 38, calling the “injury in fact” test an 
“extraordinarily novel development.” 
90 Kevin A. Coyle “Standing of Third parties to Challenge Administrative Agency Actions” California Law Review 
76:5 (Oct., 1988) (1067 “standing has become detached from its original purpose, so detached that it now creates 
barriers to adjudication that have no sound doctrinal or normative basis.” And at 1097)  See Matt The Review of 
Litigation “Why Crocodiles, Elephants, and American Citizens Should Prefer Foreign Courts: A Comparative 
Analysis of Standing to Sue” 21:1 (Winter 2002) (“It is important to note that such reluctance to allow private 
attorneys general to enforce laws is not firmly rooted in tradition” 109 “Yet another, and possibly more cynical, 
explanation for the current status of the standing doctrine is that it can be used as a proxy for a judgment of the 
merits.  Judges can use their own political ideologies by using as a pretext for disfavoring the merits of the plaintiffs’ 
case and dismissing it before it is heard” 110) See Christopher T. Burt Procedural Injury Standing after Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife University of Chicago Law Review 62 (1994)  Also, Blackmun’s dissent in Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife calling standing “standardless.”   
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acknowledged that the standing doctrine is founded on Article III “for want of a better vehicle” 
and is not “a linguistically inevitable conclusion.”91  
As Sierra Club established, the question of standing asks “whether a party has sufficient 
stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.”92  
Justice Antonin Scalia has described standing as the rude question asked, “what’s it to you?”93  
The standing doctrine is one of three criteria that a case must meet in order to be justiciable—a 
case must also meet ripeness and mootness criteria.94  The doctrine consists of two parts—
constitutional standing requirements, and statutory (or prudential) standing requirements.  The 
Court roots the constitutional requirements of standing in Article III, in which the power of the 
Court is limited to hearing “cases” or “controversies.”95  The Cases and Controversies clause in 
Article III, section 2, clause 1 reads: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which 
the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;-- 
between a State and Citizens of another State,--between Citizens of different States,--
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and 
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.96  
                                                 
91 Antonin Scalia, “The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers” Suffolk Law 
Review 17 (1983): 882.   
92 Sierra Club v Morton 
93 Antonin Scalia, “The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers” Suffolk Law 
Review 17 (1983): 882. 
94 Richard L. Pacelle Jr., The Role of the Supreme Court in American Politics: The Least Dangerous Branch? 
(Boulder CO: Westview, 2002) 87. See Warth v, Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (justiciability asks “whether the 
plaintiff has made out a ‘case or controversy’ between himself and the defendant within the meaning of [Article] 
III”).   See also, Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990) (“It is well established…that before a federal court 
can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court must establish the 
requisite standing to sue.”)  
95 US Constitution Article III 
96 U.S. Constitution Article III  § 2 clause 1 
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The modern Article III criteria for standing, as applied in Sierra Club v. Morton, were 
established in a 1970 case, Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp.97 In Data 
Processing, the Court held that standing considers, (a) if there is a “case” or “controversy” as 
articulated in Article III, and (b) if “the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is 
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question”98 (emphasis added).  In this case, the Supreme Court rejected its previous 
“legal interest” test99 and instead articulated a version of standing that defined a case or 
controversy by the “injury in fact” of the plaintiff—regardless of what the law prescribed.  In this 
case, the ruling of the Court of Appeals was consistent with previous Supreme Court rulings,100 
that the standing inquiry asked if the plaintiff had a “personal stake legally sufficient ‘to assure 
[a] concrete adverseness’ which avoids merely abstract determinations.”101  In its Data 
Processing opinion, the Supreme Court criticized the Court of Appeals’ doctrine of standing for 
requiring examination of the merits of the case to determine standing and thus rejected its own 
previous doctrine—for example, the doctrine applied in Tennessee Elec. Power Co. TVA.102   
In Sierra Club, the Court defined the “zone of interests” test, holding that if there is a 
specific statute, “inquiry as to standing must begin with a determination of whether the statute in 
question authorizes review at the behest of the plaintiff” (emphasis added). 103  The zone of 
interests question asks if the particular plaintiff’s concern is within the zone of interests protected 
                                                 
97 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp 406 F.2d   
98 Assn. of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp 406 F.2d 837 153 
99 Kevin A. Coyle, in his  “Standing of Third Parties to Challenge Administrative Agency Actions” California Law 
Review 76:5 (Oct., 1988) describes that the legal interest test recognizes two aspects to a legal claim: “courts look to 
the ‘law’ to determine if a duty has been violated” and “to determine if the plaintiff has a right to enforce that duty.” 
(1068-69)   
100 Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA 306 U.S. 118  
101 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp 406 F.2d 837  
102 306 U.S. 118 
103 Sierra Club v. Morton 
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by the statute.  The zone of interests test was not intended to limit standing.  As argued in Data 
Processing, a statute is considered to limit standing only if it explicitly precludes it.104  The 
Court found that the Administrative Procedure Act (1946) served a “broadly remedial 
purpose”105 and had provided broad standing for judicial review.106  The Court found that the 
statutory trend was “toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative 
action.”107  The opinion in Data Processing follows that trend; the Court found the legal interest 
test to be limiting because it barred citizens from court who did not have a common law mandate 
to protect their interests.108    
4.3 THREE DIFFICULTIES TO THIRD-PARTY STANDING  
As established above, citizen suit provisions recognize that the Courts are important enforcement 
mechanisms.  However, the Court itself has found these citizen suits insufficient in cases like 
Sierra Club v. Morton.  In this section I examine three factors that influence a group’s ability to 
be granted standing in court to bring suit under third party legislation.  First (4.3.1), the Court has 
found citizen suit provisions insufficient because the Court is concerned with private rights.  
These environmental statutes protect third parties from injury (and not the plaintiffs), so the 
plaintiffs must demonstrate how injury to the public good is “injury in fact” to the plaintiff.  This 
tension between the public-goods legislation and the Court’s concern for private rights is the 
                                                 
104 Assn. of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp 406 F.2d 837 156 citing APA 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) 
105 Assn. of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp 406 F.2d 837 156 
106 See, for instance, APA 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)  
107 Assn. of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp 406 F.2d 837 155 
108 See Kevin A. Coyle “Standing of Third parties to Challenge Administrative Agency Actions” 1070,  citing Flast 
v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83 (1968) and Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186 (1962) as cases in which the court recognized the 
limits of a legal interest test.  
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primary explanation for the difficulties groups face in third-party legislation.  There are two 
additional factors that compound this difficulty.  For one, (4.3.2), the Court has been 
inconsistently rigorous in defining “injury,” often exacerbating the challenge presented by an 
“injury in fact” test.  Furthermore, (4.3.3), the Court disagrees as to whether the injury must be 
felt by a minority of the population.  I will explain the implications of these discrepancies on 
efforts to establish standing. 
4.3.1 Public Goods v. Private Rights 
Since Data Processing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has been injured in fact in 
order to bring suit.  The Court has since derived three criteria from the language of Article III: 
that a plaintiff must claim an “injury in fact” which is “(a) concrete and particularized and (b) 
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; that the injury must be fairly traceable to 
action taken by the defendant;109 and that a ruling in favor of the plaintiff should be likely (and 
not speculative) to redress the injury.110  In order to satisfy these Article III requirements, a 
“plaintiff must generally assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest claim to relief 
on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”111  This is often difficult for groups to do in 
                                                 
109 For instance, see Linda R.S. v. Richard D. 410 U.S. 614 (1973) in which plaintiff (an unwed mother) was denied 
standing to challenge a Texas law that only provided criminal sanctions to parents of legitimate children.  The court 
argued that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the law was the source of her child’s lack of support.  
Furthermore, the court did not find redressability because if plaintiff’s child’s father failed to pay support, he might 
be put in jail and her child would still be unsupported.     
110 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 560 (1992) ( internal citations omitted).  Joseph T. Phillips in “Friends of the 
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: Impact, Outcomes, and the Future viability of Environmental Citizen 
Suits,” University of Cincinnati Law Review 68 (1999-2000) explains the three prong test well: “if the plaintiff 
cannot allege sufficient facts to demonstrate “injury in fact” caused by the defendant’s unlawful actions that can be 
redressed through the inherent power of the court, the court must not allow eh case to go forward” 1291. 
111 Warth v. Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
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environmental cases, because a citizen must prove that injury to the protected public good is 
injury to the plaintiff.     
This dilemma is rooted in a conflict between the legislature’s consideration of public 
goods and the courts consideration of private injuries.  The difficulty arises from the statutory 
language committing the government to environmental protection.  Although the statutes 
recognize anthropocentric reasons for the provision of these public goods, they do not articulate 
how the public could be injured by the good’s failed provision.  Consider that the Sierra Club 
was denied standing when it failed to demonstrate how it had been injured in fact. 
A decision in 1997 highlights the Court’s emphasis on private rights.  In Bennett v. 
Spear, the court held unanimously that a group of irrigation districts and ranch operators who 
opposed actions taken by the Fish and Wildlife service had standing under the citizen-suit 
provision of the ESA.112  Although the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s claim was not 
within the “zone of interests” of the statute, the Supreme Court held unanimously that it was.  
Respondents could demonstrate injury in fact because their injury was economic.  Justice Scalia 
is especially adamant that the role of the Court is to hear these cases, in which the plaintiff is 
injured by regulatory action and should be defended from the majority.113  This case, where the 
ranchers were able to sue under the citizen-suit provision to undermine the effectiveness of the 
act, comes five years after a decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife in which the Court 
rejected standing for plaintiffs who sued to protect the species under the law.114  Defenders of 
Wildlife were denied standing because their members failed to produce plane tickets that would 
                                                 
112 502 U.S. 154 
113 See his Suffolk Law Review Article and subsequent court opinions 
114 Joseph T. Phillips “Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: Impact, Outcomes, and the Future 
viability of Environmental Citizen Suits,” University of Cincinnati Law Review 68 (1999-2000) (1288 “this decision 
grants access to the courts to adversaries of the environmental legislation under the very citizen suit provision that 
was created to further environmental interests.”) 
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prove their intentions to return to the area where the species were endangered.  Compare the ease 
plaintiffs had in Bennett v. Spear to the difficulty Defenders of Wildlife had in demonstrating 
injury.  The ranchers were defending private interests, for which injury is easily demonstrable.  
The Defenders of Wildlife, although expressing personal interests, were defending a public good.  
These two decisions demonstrate how citizens have difficulty proving injury to public goods in 
injury to them.            
A recent case demonstrates the difficulty groups can have in protecting intergenerational 
environmental goods in court.  In Massachusetts v. EPA (2007), the state of Massachusetts, a 
collection of other state and local governments, and private individuals sued the Environmental 
Protection Agency.  The Environmental Protection Agency had denied the group’s petition that 
called for EPA to regulate four greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles under the Clean Air 
Act, and plaintiffs filed suit under the CAA’s citizen-suit provision.  The Clean Air Act 
authorizes challenges to agency action or inaction in regards to a nondiscretionary statutory 
action.115  The Supreme Court had two questions in Massachusetts: whether the Clean Air Act 
gives EPA authority to regulate greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles, and, if so, whether 
EPA’s stated reasons as to why it would not regulate had it the authority are consistent with the 
Clean Air Act.  Of the plaintiffs, the court granted standing specifically to Massachusetts.  The 
state claimed a procedural injury that threatened concrete interests as a semi-sovereign entity and 
as a property owner. 
In order to establish standing in this case, the plaintiffs would have to prove that the 
failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new vehicles would cause them injury.  Thus, 
in order to compel EPA to determine if greenhouse gases caused climate change, the plaintiffs 
                                                 
115 Clean Air Act 42 U. S. C. 7607(b)(1) and (2) 
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themselves had to demonstrate that GHGs were contributing to climate change.  Furthermore, 
they need demonstrate that this climate change would harm them particularly (for Massachusetts, 
it demonstrated a rise of sea level that would harm Massachusetts’ coastline.)  EPA argued that a 
causal link between the release of greenhouse gases and climate change could not be 
“unequivocally established,” and used this scientific uncertainty, among other arguments, to 
justify its refusal to regulate greenhouse gases.  EPA, the supposed agency expert on this issue, 
had articulated this scientific uncertainty, yet in order for the plaintiffs to meet the standing 
requirements, they had to provide evidence that EPA’s refusal to limit greenhouse gases caused 
them injury in fact.  Had Massachusetts not joined the plaintiffs, the case would not have been 
heard—none of the individuals had standing.       
 In these cases, groups try to protect public goods in an institution concerned with private 
rights.  Under statutes that, like the Endangered Species Act, protect third parties, it is especially 
difficult for a plaintiff to establish standing.116  A citizen must prove that injury to the third party 
is injury to the plaintiff.  The injury in fact test required for a citizen to gain statutory standing is 
particularly problematic for obtaining judicial review regarding environmental legislation, in 
which the protected is a natural entity and not granted legal personhood.  The group that best 
reconciles these differences by demonstrating such a chain of injury will have the most 
convincing argument for standing.  Often, these standing difficulties prevent an otherwise 
straightforward legal question from being heard before the court.117  This institutional tension is 
compounded by two factors of a political nature.     
                                                 
116 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S. 555 (1992) 
117 Kevin A. Coyle, “Standing of Third parties to Challenge Administration Agency Actions,” California law Review 
76:5 (Oct. 1988) 1063.  
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4.3.2 Inconsistent Rigor in Application 
 The “injury in fact” requirement of the Court is a consistent consideration among all of the 
justices.  The Court, however, has not specifically defined the rigor with which it will examine a 
plaintiff’s injury.  Within “injury in fact,” the court has not consistently defined “imminent” or 
“particularized.”  Despite the holding in Data Processing, the Court has sometimes transformed 
its Article III test—the standing requirements based on the “case” and “controversy” clause—
from a broad grant of standing expressed in Data Processing to a quite particularized definition 
of standing. 
The Court has recognized its decision in United States v. SCRAP (1973) as its broadest 
grant of standing.118  The Court granted standing to a group of law students who challenged the 
Interstate Commerce Commission’s (ICC) decision to deny an optional seven-month period 
between the proposal and the implementation of freight rate raises.  Specifically, SCRAP argued 
that the failure to allow the seven-month suspension period would cause the students 
“‘economic, recreational and aesthetic harm,’ and specifically, that the new rate structure would 
discourage the use of ‘recyclable’ materials and promote the use of raw materials that compete 
with scrap, thus adversely affecting the environment.”119  SCRAP argued “that each of its 
members was caused to pay more for finished products, that each of its members uses the forests, 
rivers, mountains, and other natural resources of the Washington, D.C., area, and at his legal 
residence for camping, hiking, fishing, and other purposes, and that these uses have been 
                                                 
118 412 U.S. 670 
119 412 U.S. 670 
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adversely affected by increased freight rates.”120  The ruling in SCRAP considers “injury in fact,” 
but grants standing based on an admitted “attenuated line of causation to the eventual injury.”121   
The Court’s decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992) signaled a shift to a 
demanding application of the standing doctrine.  Defenders of Wildlife (DOW) claimed that the 
failure of agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior regarding the potential threat to 
endangered species by funded activities internationally "increas[es] the rate of extinction of 
endangered and threatened species."122  The Court focused on the testimony of two members of 
the organization who had previously traveled to an international site that was now the location of 
a development project that threatened endangered species in the area.  Each project was in part 
funded by an American agency.  Each respondent articulated intent to return to the location with 
hopes of seeing said endangered animals.  Neither could demonstrate when exactly they intended 
to return to the site—one of the plaintiffs citing the ongoing civil war in Sri Lanka as a 
preventative factor in her return.       
According to a plurality of the Court, the respondents had insufficiently demonstrated 
how they would be imminently harmed by the disappearance of the species.  Scalia, writing the 
majority opinion, recognized that “of course, the desire to use or observe an animal species, even 
for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.”123 
However, Scalia argued, citing Sierra Club, the respondents failed to prove how the 
environmental injury was injurious to them.  In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy (with 
Justice Souter joining) suggested that had the members of DOW presented plane tickets 
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indicating their imminent return, they could have demonstrated sufficient injury.124  Regardless 
of when the harm to the species occurred, the harm to the plaintiffs was not imminent unless they 
were traveling to the location very soon.  Justice Stevens disagreed, arguing that DOW had 
standing based on their affidavits.  Assured that the members would return to the area at some 
point based on their aesthetic and scholarly interests, Stevens argued that the individual is injured 
when the action is taken against the species or the habitat.125  In this part of the case, it was the 
“imminent” requirement that prevented Defenders of Wildlife from having standing.  Compare 
the accepted injury in SCRAP to the rejected injury in Defenders of Wildlife.  In Defenders of 
Wildlife, the members had professional interests in the threatened species and had visited before, 
and had the financial means to return.  The Court found the testimonies of DOW to be mere 
generalized grievances.  That demonstrated use of the good was insufficient because of the 
rigorous application of a demanding Article III test.   
The Court’s holding in Laidlaw Environmental Services v. Friends of the Earth (2000) 
might signal a broadening of standing.126  Friends of the Earth (FOE) sued Laidlaw after it had 
continually discharged treated water containing various pollutants (especially mercury) into the 
North Tyger River repeatedly in excess of the limits established by its National Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.  FOE filed a citizen-suit, “alleging 
noncompliance with the NPDES permit and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and an 
award of civil penalties.”127  Citing its definition of standing in Defenders of Wildlife, the Court 
found that FOE had demonstrated injury in fact.  The District Court found that FOE had standing 
(although barely), based on the testimony of several members who lived on or near the river and 
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127 Laidlaw Environmental Services 528 U.S. 167 (2000) 
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had refrained from using the river because of concerns about illegal discharges.128  The Court 
found injury in fact in the affidavits and testimony “asserting that Laidlaw’s pollutant discharges, 
and the affiants’ reasonable concerns about the effects of those discharges, directly affected those 
affiants’ recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests.”   
Laidlaw supported its claim by citing the District Court’s discovery that there had been 
“no demonstrated proof of harm to the environment” by Laidlaw’s violations of the permit.129 
The Supreme Court, however, argued that standing considered injury to the plaintiff and not 
injury to the environment.  The court argued, “To insist upon the former rather than the latter as 
part of the standing inquiry (as the dissent in essence does, post, at 2—3) is to raise the standing 
hurdle higher than the necessary showing for success on the merits in an action alleging 
noncompliance with an NPDES permit.”130  Even though the environment providing the 
recreational good was not decidedly harmed, the violation of the permit harmed the plaintiff’s 
consumption of the good.  Legal scholars agree that the decision in Laidlaw lowered the 
threshold for citizen-suits standing, “thereby liberalizing access to federal courts.”131  These 
cases demonstrate that the court has inconsistently looked for injury in fact.  The stricter the 
requirements for injury, the more difficulty groups will have in establishing standing. 
The Court furthermore has inconsistently considered an “environmental nexus” argument 
sufficient for standing.  An “ecosystem nexus” theory proposes that any citizen who uses part of 
a contiguous ecosystem has standing when any part of that ecosystem is harmed.  In Defenders 
of Wildlife (1992) and a case two years before, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, the court 
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rejected this argument.132  As Justice Blackman highlights in his dissent in Defenders of Wildlife, 
the court rejected an “ecosystem nexus” argument in National Wildlife Federation because the 
claimed injury was to a scenic view.  He writes that of course, “one cannot suffer from the sight 
of a ruined landscape without being close enough to see the sites actually being mined.”133  The 
Court has, however, in other cases recognized the validity of a nexus argument.  Consider Japan 
Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society (1986) in which the court granted standing to 
American whale watchers who arguably would be affected by Japanese whaling activities.134  
This decision recognized that reverberations throughout the marine environment could be 
grounds for standing, for a violation in one area of a contiguous ecosystem could indeed harm a 
citizen’s interests elsewhere in that ecosystem.  Again, a group’s access to the Court is dependent 
upon the Court’s parameters for injury.     
4.3.3 Purpose: ‘Adverseness’ or ‘Individualized’?  
The prominent standing cases since Data Processing demonstrate considerable 
inconsistency among justices, and subsequent holdings, regarding the goal of standing.  
According to the Court in part, the primary goal of standing is to encourage the adverse 
presentation of the issues.  In Data Processing, the Court of Appeals emphasized that concrete 
adverseness assured by a particular legal interest would avoid “abstract determinations.”135  
Often the majority has emphasized the importance of concrete adverseness in the Court’s use of 
standing, arguing that regardless of how widely felt the injury is, the presentation of the issues 
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will be precise and charged if there is a concrete injury.136  In Sierra Club v. Morton, the court 
asserted, “[T]he fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than 
the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.”137  
SCRAP reaffirmed that decision.  Significantly, the Court also held that standing is not denied 
simply because the injury is felt equally by all who use a certain resource.138  The Court argued 
further that in this case, “all persons who utilize the scenic resources of the country, and indeed 
all who breathe its air” could also have standing by claiming a similar harm.139  Clean air is a 
good, when provided, that is equally consumed.  With a generalized consideration of injury, 
citizens can prove that the failed provision of a public good injures them in a generalized 
manner.  This is much easier for a citizen to do than for her to meet the criteria defined by Justice 
Scalia.   
According most vehemently to Justice Scalia, the standing doctrine should allow the 
court to hear only controversies of the minority, and thus standing is a necessary tool to uphold 
the separation of powers.  He strongly defends that the position of the court is to hear only suits 
from those with an individualized injury, and should disregard those concrete injuries that are 
felt broadly, regardless if the injury is of a concrete nature.140  Those injuries felt by a broader 
public should be taken up in the political arena.  The Court, in Marbury v. Madison, held that it 
is beyond the Court’s jurisdiction to hear claims of generalized grievance against the executive’s 
failure to execute the law. 141  Scalia writes, “To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated 
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University Law Review 17 (1983). See also, Fed. Election Comm’n v Akins 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
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public interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable 
in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief 
Executive's most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,’ Art. II, § 3.”142  But Scalia connects all generalized grievances with failure to uphold 
the law.  Ultimately, it is important for the Court to distinguish between particularized injuries 
and general grievances to maintain the separation of powers between the branches of 
government.143      
This difference in conceptions of standing speaks to the Court’s role in public goods 
cases.  Just as Scalia consistently maintains his position, so does Justice Stevens.  The 
inconsistent rulings of the court demonstrate that there is tension among justices regarding the 
proper role of “injury in fact” for standing.  The ability of plaintiffs to get judicial review of 
agency action that threatens the provision of statutorily provided public goods is dependant upon 
the way the Court resolves this conflict regarding the nature of the injury.  As mentioned, a 
general complaint as to the failed provision of a public good is insufficient to have standing in 
court.  The plaintiff must demonstrate that the failed provision injures the plaintiff in some way.  
In Sierra Club, it was easy for Sierra Club members to demonstrate their use of Mineral King 
would be injured by Disney’s development and therefore by the action of the Forest Service 
                                                                                                                                                             
circumscribed by the authority granted. This permits the courts to participate in law enforcement entrusted to 
administrative bodies only to the extent necessary to protect justiciable individual rights against administrative 
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which sold Disney the permit.  In many instances, it will be possible for a plaintiff to 
demonstrate injury by a violation of a public goods statute.   
Under an ‘adverseness’ model for standing, a plaintiff needs simply to demonstrate that 
she will be injured by the statutory violation.  In other words, the plaintiff need demonstrate that 
they consume or use the protected public good, and thus if the public good is not provided, the 
plaintiff will be injured.  A citizen need demonstrate that they are injured by the polluted air, or 
ocean plastic, or climate change.  These injuries are already potentially difficult injuries to 
demonstrate, and a “minority interest” test requires something further.  In order to meet a 
“separation-of-powers” criterion, a plaintiff need demonstrate that her consumption of the public 
good is greater than the consumption of that good by the majority, or that her consumption will 
be more adversely impacted by the failure to provide the good.  This test will also be easily 
passed in cases that involve local environmental degradation.  Consider a plaintiff who would 
like to swim and fish in a local river, but cannot because of a film of pollution in the top.  This 
plaintiff can demonstrate that her recreational interest is injured, and that her injury is only felt 
by the minority of people who wish to use the river for that purpose.  The “minority interest” test 
becomes difficult when the public good is equally consumed by the entire population.  Consider 
the public good of a stable climate.  Let us assume that climate change will affect every citizen in 
a generalized manner.  Can any one citizen demonstrate that they will be more adversely affected 
by climate change than any other?144  Scalia, in his famous Suffolk Law Review article, rejects 
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the ‘adverseness’ argument in SCRAP and criticizes the Court for undermining the power of the 
executive by considering such broad injuries.145 
This debate between the minority and majority interest bears heavily on the public goods 
issue.  The ‘adverseness’ model considers injuries to the public as justiciable, as long as those 
who stand in court are actually injured.  The ‘individualized’ model considers injuries to public 
goods skeptically.  Combined with a strict interpretation of “injury in fact,” the ‘individualized’ 
model can grant the Court authority to deny standing very broadly in EPG cases.   
                                                 
145 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers Suffolk University 
Law Review 17 (1983) 890. 
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5.0  PARTICULARIZED INJURY AND PUBLIC GOODS: A RECONCILIATION  
This paper articulates the difficulties in citizens bringing suit to protect public goods because the 
citizens are often unable to demonstrate sufficient “injury in fact.”  These suits are necessary to 
government provision of public goods.  Because no individual has an incentive to restrict her 
consumption of the environmental commons, external institutions are necessary to solve the 
collective action problem.  Gaining impressive momentum in the 1960s, public outcry for 
government provision of environmental public goods led to a body of environmental protection 
statutes that established the government’s role in the provision of environmental public goods.  
EPGs are especially exigent to provide because of the intergenerational nature of the protection 
required.  In order for environmental public goods to be provided for future generations, it is 
necessary that the regulating agencies continually commit to this goal.  As the previous chapter 
demonstrated, the court’s application of the standing doctrine poses challenges to groups that 
seek to provide external checks on agency administration.   
It becomes apparent that the decisions made on the Court regarding standing are 
influenced by justices’ particular interpretations of court doctrine and precedent.  It seems that 
ideology influences a justice’s consideration of the severity of an injury and of the model they 
will choose.  Regardless, the Court has consistently looked for an “injury in fact.”  Although 
some justices are more specific than others in their consideration of this injury, the Court 
consistently demands the plaintiff be injured in some personal way.  This suggests that a 
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universal grant of standing under a citizen-suit provision is insufficient for standing regardless of 
which way the swing-Justice swings.  This conclusion raises the question: Is it constitutionally 
and legally possible to reconcile the protection of public goods with the court’s private rights 
concerns so that plaintiffs can seek judicial review of agency actions that violate these EPG 
statutes while meeting the Court’s “injury in fact” test? 
Although the Court held in Defenders of Wildlife that Congress could not confer standing 
upon any citizen as it provided in the ESA’s citizen-suit provision, the Court also recognized 
Congress’s ability to create new legal rights not yet codified.146  Justice Kennedy (concurring), 
echoing the plurality, recognizes that “Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate 
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”147  
Kennedy specifies that “in exercising this power, however, Congress must at the very least 
identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to 
bring suit.”148  The citizen suit in the ESA failed to explain how any citizen would be injured by 
a failure of the statute to prevent the endangerment of species.  While the citizen-suits are 
insufficient as they stand, Congress has the authority to modify them so that they are effective.   
This modification can happen in two ways.  The first would require a change in the Court 
or the legislature’s consideration of what constitutes an injury.  The second would require a 
change in the legislature’s consideration of what constitutes an injured person.  This conclusion 
proposes two theoretical mechanisms that could reconcile the legislature’s public-goods 
consideration and the Court’s private injury consideration that should be further researched for 
                                                 
146 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (“Nothing in this contradicts the principle that "[t]he . . . injury required by Art. III 
may exist solely by virtue of `statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.' " Warth, 422 U. 
S., at 500 (quoting Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617, n. 3 (1973))).” 
147 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Kennedy concurring 
148 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, Kennedy 
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the practicality of their implementation.  It further comments on the limitations of a national 
focus on the provision of EPGs.      
5.1 A DIFFERENT “INJURY IN FACT” 
“If the Bill of Rights contains no guarantee that a citizen shall be secure against lethal poisons 
distributed either by private individuals or by public officials, it is surely only because our 
forefathers, despite their considerable wisdom and foresight, could conceive of no such 
problem.” –Rachel Carson, Silent Spring149 
  
The Supreme Court has, since Marbury v. Madison (1803), consistently established that concern 
for the proper functioning of the executive is insufficient to establish a “case” or “controversy” 
as defined by Article III.150  The Supreme Court has, since Data Processing (1970), consistently 
established that a procedural right is insufficient to demonstrate standing, and plaintiffs must also 
demonstrate how the failed procedure threatens a citizen’s interest.  Environmental protection 
statutes now define federal policy, but do not recognize specifically what the citizen’s interests in 
those policies are.  The court recognizes aesthetic and recreational interest as potential grounds 
for standing, but under the current legislation, the Court is able to interpret this injury, and deny 
or grant standing as it sees fit.151  As demonstrated, the Court has inconsistently defined “injury,” 
and thus produced a confusing and inconsistent body of environmental standing cases.   
This problem can be articulated in the following way.  The court has inconsistently 
determined which methods of public-goods consumption are sufficient to be granted standing.  
                                                 
149 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), 17. 
150 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
151 Cass R. Sunstein in “Standing for Animals (with notes on animal rights)” UCLA Law Review 47 (2000) (1352 
“the legal system is denying that people suffer injury in fact for reasons that involve not facts but judgments about 
what facts, and what harms, ought to count for legal purposes.”)  
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The Court can interpret what constitutes a “recreational or aesthetic” interest, and the Court has 
held that an injury can only be felt if it is physically and temporally close.  In Sierra Club, the 
Court recognized that, “the alleged injury will be felt directly only by those who use Mineral 
King and Sequoia National Park, and for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area 
will be lessened by the highway and ski resort” (emphasis added).  It affirmed that solidary 
happiness that a citizen finds purely by knowing the valley exists is insufficient to establish an 
“aesthetic interest.”  In Defenders of Wildlife, the standard required exact physical location and 
imminence.  Kennedy’s concurring opinion suggested that plane tickets demonstrating imminent 
return would be a sufficient demonstration of the level of consumption of the good.     
Given that “injury in fact” is a consistent consideration of the Court, how can citizens 
have standing under these environmental statutes?  As Justice Kennedy articulates, Congress 
cannot create new plaintiffs without recognizing new injuries.  Congress must change what 
injuries are considered legitimate.  In order to ensure the justiciability of environmental cases 
while adhering to the Court’s standing doctrine, a new environmental right or interest must be 
codified that would recognize a less particular injury as the only injury “in fact.”  If Congress 
was to indentify a new kind of right and statutorily prevent injury to it, more plaintiffs would 
have standing to sue. 
This right or interest would be a clear definition of a citizen’s interest in the provision of 
environmental public goods.  A new conception of injury could include ecosystem nexus 
arguments, professional interests, or symbolic concerns.  These injuries are all dependent upon 
recognition of mechanisms of consumption of public goods that do not require immediate 
physical proximity.  Because the court has not clearly defined its position regarding ecosystem 
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nexus arguments,152 this is one area in which a changed consideration of “injured” is possible.  If 
this change in perception of injury occurred, a citizen need not demonstrate that they use the 
specific area where the harm occurred, but rather, because they enjoy part of a contiguous 
ecosystem, can demonstrate that their area of recreational interest will be injured.  In Defenders 
of Wildlife, the Court rejected DOW’s argument of harm due to an “ecosystem nexus,” or an 
argument that anyone who used part of a contiguous ecosystem was harmed when part of that 
ecosystem was harmed.  However, as Stevens demonstrated, there are still demonstrable injuries 
in many “ecosystem nexus” cases.153  Japan Whaling Association demonstrated how an 
ecosystem nexus argument may be considered by granting standing to American whalers injured 
by Japanese whaling practices.   
Mark Sagoff articulates the symbolic importance of natural entities.  If a symbolic injury 
were recognized, citizens who are unable to physically hike in the Grand Tetons could defend 
their interest in the preservation of the mountains.  This change in the conception of “injury” is 
precedented and possible.  It was not until the 1960s when injuries to aesthetic and recreational 
interests were recognized as justiciable.154  As the Court develops environmental expertise, it 
may again change its conceptions of injury.   
                                                 
152 See Japan Whaling Assn, National Wildlife Federation, Defenders of Wildlife, and Defenders of Wildlife, Stevens 
concurring  
153 See Christopher T. Burt, “Procedural Injury Standing after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,” University of Chicago 
Law Review 62 (1994) (“Just as injuries resulting from dirty air or depleted animal species have only recently 
become cognizable, perhaps the Court might one day recognize as concrete the environmental interest of concerned 
citizens who do not live near or plan to visit a threatened area.  Until then, environmentalists and all procedural 
plaintiffs are bound by current conceptions of injury.” 299) 
154 Sunstein, in “Standing for Animals” (2000) reminds us that not all aesthetic injuries are justiciable, writing, 
“people in California might well feel disgust, distaste, or offense, if they hear of racial discrimination, or a 
commercial development, on Long Island, but this does not give them standing” (1353).  He argues that “plaintiffs 
claiming aesthetic injuries should have standing if they are complaining about the government’s failure to issue or 
enforce regulations that, if issued or enforced, would eliminate those injuries” (1357). 
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A new conception of injury still has its limitations in court.  Under an “adverseness” 
model, citizens would have new legal tools with which to define their injuries.  This would be 
effective when the public good is something that can be unevenly consumed, and demonstrably 
so.  Consider the injuries in Sierra Club (public land) and even Defenders of Wildlife (scholarly 
and personal interest in the observance of endangered species).  Had a scholarly interest been 
recognized as legitimate grounds, it would have been easier for plaintiffs to demonstrate injury.  
But under an “individualized” model, a differently conceived injury might still be rejected.  
Consider a citizen’s potential right to a stable climate.  According to Defenders of Wildlife and 
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Massachusetts, no citizen would have standing because the 
grievance is still general.155  Regardless of what sort of injury the three-prong standing test 
considers, an “’individualized’ model would reject a citizen claiming a generalized injury.  Who 
can demonstrate she will be more affected by the lack of biointegrity than her neighbor?      
Still, this argument offers a way in which many of these standing conflicts could be 
resolved.  Until Congress or the Court redefines its conception of injury—in other words, 
considers different methods of consumption as sufficient--environmental plaintiffs will need to 
continue to demonstrate injury in fact to a potentially strict consideration of injury parameters. 
156   
                                                 
155 Massachusetts v. EPA 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (The Chief Justice writes, “Global warming may be a “crisis,” even 
“the most pressing environmental problem of our time.” Pet. for Cert. 26, 22. Indeed, it may ultimately affect nearly 
everyone on the planet in some potentially adverse way, and it may be that governments have done too little to 
address it. It is not a problem, however, that has escaped the attention of policymakers in the Executive and 
Legislative Branches of our Government, who continue to consider regulatory, legislative, and treaty-based means 
of addressing global climate change.”) 
156 See Christopher T. Burt, “Procedural Injury Standing after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife” (1994) (“Just as 
injuries resulting from dirty air or depleted animal species have only recently become cognizable, perhaps the Court 
might one day recognize as concrete the environmental interest of concerned citizens who do not live near or plan to 
visit a threatened area.  Until then, environmentalists and all procedural plaintiffs are bout by current conceptions of 
injury.” 299) 
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Often, before the federal government makes changes, states take the lead.  This case is no 
different.  Several states already recognize a citizen’s right to a healthy environment.  The 
environmental right granted takes a public interest or good and converts it into a private right.  
The states that recognize a specific, constitutional environmental right are Pennsylvania, Hawaii, 
and Illinois.157  For example, the Pennsylvania state constitution Bill of Rights is the most 
specific, recognizing the right of the people to “clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of 
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.”  Furthermore, it recognizes 
that “Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all the people, 
including generations yet to come,” and that, “As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth 
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people” (emphasis added).158  In order 
to protect the commons for future generations, the Commonwealth, as trustee, has adopted a 
policy for the provision of intergenerational public goods.   
The constitutions of Hawaii and Illinois recognize the right of the citizens to a healthful 
environment.159  Significantly, these two constitutions also include very similar citizen-suit 
provisions that offer, “[a]ny person may enforce this right against any party, public or private, 
through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as 
provided by law.”160    
                                                 
157 11 states grant the right to hunt and fish or provide for the maintenance of wildlife and fish for such purposes.  
This very specific provision was not considered an environmental right.  Interestingly, all but one of these states had 
other environmental provisions, suggesting that the reserved right to hunt and fish was in response to conservation 
legislation.  
158 PA Constitution Article I Section 27 
159 Illinois Article XI Section 2 Hawaii Article IX Section 9.  Hawaii defines what that right entails: “Each person 
has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality, including 
control of pollution and conservation, protection and enhancement of natural resources.”  
160 Hawaii Article IX Section 9.  Illinois’ provision reads: “Each person may enforce this right against any party, 
governmental or private, through appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and regulation as the 
General Assembly may provide by law.” Article XI Section 2 
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Judge Richard A. Posner argues that the public good and private rights are inseparable, 
that, “the private right is conferred in order to promote the public good.”161  In the case of these 
state constitutions, this is what occurred.  The state found provision of these public goods 
threatened and now recognize a right of the citizens to these public goods.  Congress and the 
courts could recognize a new interest without a constitutional amendment, as it did with 
recreational and environmental interests in the 1960s.  Still, because of the Court’s deference to 
the Constitution, “[a]n activity would be more likely deemed the subject of a case or controversy 
if it were actually in conflict with an express Constitutional right.”162  Currently, it has been 
argued that the Constitution has been used as both a sword and a shield in regards to 
environmental rights.  The constitution is used as a sword by those who interpret a previously 
unrecognized right in the same document, and as a shield by those who claim that if the 
Constitution does not recognize the right, there is no cause of action. 163  If Congress recognizes 
an environmental right of citizens, groups would have more leverage in court.  A constitutional 
right would help to take a public interest and change it to a private right defendable in court.  Of 
course, this right would have to recognize the specific parameters of the right, or else the court 
could make the same interpretations it has regarding the scope of the right.  An environmental 
right, in order to meet the court’s standing requirements, should recognize a broad category of 
interests.  If, like in Illinois and Hawaii, the constitution granted standing, the federal courts 
would have to defer. 
                                                 
161 Richard A. Posner, “What Am I?  A Potted Plant?” in American Politics: Classic and Contemporary Readings 
ed. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008) 471. 
162 Matt Handley “Why Crocodiles, Elephants, and American Citizens Should Prefer Foreign Courts” 116. 
163 Matt Handley Why Crocodiles, Elephants, and American Citizens Should Prefer Foreign Courts: A Comparative 
Analysis of Standing to Sue The Review of Litigation 21:1 (Winter 2002) 116. 
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5.2 A DIFFERENT INJURED “PERSON” 
This paper considers the difficulties in citizens bringing suit to protect public goods because the 
citizens are unable to demonstrate an “injury in fact” that the Court considers legitimate.  This 
final section proposes a way in which to solve this that, instead of reconsidering the injury, 
reconsiders the injured.  Citizens claiming injury from the failed provision of a public good need 
demonstrate that the injury to the good is an injury to the citizen.  In these standing cases, the 
citizens are third parties, suing the government for its failure to regulate someone else, and 
indeed these citizens often have a difficult time meeting the three-prong requirements for 
standing.164     
Consider the Endangered Species Act as it exemplifies this problem.  The Endangered 
Species Act protects endangered species.  The injured party under the statute is the public good, 
and the harmful agency action is that which threatens the provision of the public good.  Despite 
this purpose, a citizen wishing to bring suit against a party harming an endangered species must 
prove that she is directly injured by actions taken against the species. To demonstrate “injury in 
fact” under the Endangered Species Act, a citizen must prove that actions harming a species 
threaten her own legally protected interest.  A citizen must demonstrate that they are injured by 
injury to the public good.     
                                                 
164 Consider Defenders of Wildlife’s difficulty in demonstrating redressability for two reasons, first, because the 
American funding for the project was only a tenth of the funding so the project might continue and second, because 
there was no guarantee that the agency, not a party in the litigation, would actually consult with the secretary.  
Consider the difficulty Massachusetts had in demonstrating redressability – the court ruled in favor of 
Massachusetts, arguing that the whole injury need not be redressed, and any action by the EPA would redress a bit 
of the state’s injury.    
 56 
One proposed solution to the problems that third-party citizens encounter in attempts to 
establish standing has been to provide the natural entities themselves standing in court.165  As 
established, private citizens have difficulty standing in court because they are third parties in 
environmental protection.  Changing what the injury is, as suggested above, would make these 
private citizens second parties because they would be defending a legal interest in the public 
good.  This second proposition, to change who the injured is, would grant second-party status to 
the natural entities protected by public-goods legislation.  This standing is legally possible and 
satisfies the three-prong Constitutional requirements.   
First, standing for natural entities is legally and constitutionally possible.  As Defenders 
of Wildlife affirmed, Congress could grant standing in a statute, as long as Congress articulates 
how that upon which it is conferring standing suffers an injury the statute has been written to 
protect.  The other, more controversial and far-reaching provision could be for a constitutional 
amendment that articulates the rights of natural entities, therefore establishing legal rights they 
could defend in court.  Corporations, estates, states, infants, incompetents, municipalities, 
universities, and even ships are all non-speaking entities that have been granted standing.166  
Particularly in regards to specific statutory provisions, legal standing for natural entities is 
possible.  
Standing for natural entities would help to solve the third-party problems that citizens 
encounter.  If the statutes protect the goods and not the citizens’ rights to those goods, the 
citizens are often denied standing.  However, an endangered species or the Mineral King Valley 
                                                 
165 See Cass R. Sunstein in “Standing for Animals (with notes on animal rights)” UCLA Law Review 47 (2000), 
Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Nature (Los Altos, Cal.: William 
Kaufman, Inc. I974) and Katherine A. Burke, Can We Stand For it?  Amending the Endangered Species Act With an 
Animal-Suit Provision, University of Colorado Law Review 75 (2004). 
166 Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Nature (Los Altos, Cal.: William 
Kaufman, Inc. I974) 17. 
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could demonstrate that a violation of the particular statute would harm them in fact.  The statute 
is created to prevent these environmental injuries.  It would be fairly easy for Congress to then 
connect the injury the statute intends to prevent with those entities upon which it confers 
standing.   
Lawyer Katherine Burke has applied this idea to the Endangered Species Act.167  An 
animal-suit provision would meet the requirements Congress must fulfill.  Congress could 
clearly relate the injury that it is trying to prevent (the endangerment of species) to the bearer of 
standing (the animal) and a ruling in the plaintiff’s favor would redress the injury (halt harm to 
that species).168  Several problems result from Burke’s use of “animal” in her provision instead 
of “species.”  These problems are psychological and practical, and suggest further dilemmas 
under other statutes, but these could be resolved.    First, there is a significant difference in what 
type of plaintiff these two would be.  Granting “personhood” to an animal would incite 
tremendous controversy, much of which I will not address in this paper.  Granting standing to a 
species actually seems more benign.  Although a species might be comprised of individuals that 
can feel pain, but a species cannot feel pain.  In this respect, a species is more similar to a 
mountain or a river than to an individual animal.  Granting legal personhood under a specific 
statute to a mountain need not confer moral equality upon the mountain.169  The psychological 
issue of recognizing moral equality in mice or skunks no longer applies.  Granting a species 
“personhood” is not a moral issue, but a practical one.170  Furthermore, a specific individual of a 
                                                 
167 Katherine A. Burke, Can We Stand For it?  Amending the Endangered Species Act With an Animal-Suit 
Provision, University of Colorado Law Review 75 (2004) 651. 
168 Burke, 651. 
169 Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Nature (Los Altos, Cal.: William 
Kaufman, Inc. I974). 
170 Cass Sunstein in “Standing for Animals,” (2000) argues that standing for animals is also not an issue of moral 
rights, but of legal rights.  Furthermore, Sunstein argues that an animal’s capacity to suffer should grant it standing 
and legal protection under the law. 1364. 
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species might not be harmed by actions that threaten the species.  For instance, an individual 
animal might not be hurt or killed by habitat modification or destruction.  These same 
modifications or destruction could affect that individual’s ability to reproduce, thus affecting the 
future population of the species.  Indeed, the intent of the Endangered Species Act is to protect 
species and populations, not individuals.  There is a great difference in wildlife management 
when the goal changes from protection of the individual to protection of the species.  The 
species-suit provision has a similar effect as the animal-suit provision.  If a species had standing, 
then regardless of injury to human citizens, a guardian for the species could speak on behalf of 
“its interests.”  Ultimately, this standing would prevent practices that are already illegal, as 
denoted in environmental protection statutes. 
This concept is not foreign to the courts.  In 1972, Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent in 
Sierra Club in which he proposed this very structure:  
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we 
fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal 
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, 
defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers, and where injury is the subject of public 
outrage. Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium 
should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own 
preservation.171 
 Thus far this concept of extending standing to natural entities has been addressed inconsistently 
in appellate courts, and only in consideration of species.  Still, these cases do not deny that 
Congress could grant standing if it chose.  In 2004, the 9th Circuit Court ruled in Cetacean 
Community v. Bush (2004) that the plaintiff did not have standing to sue under the Endangered 
Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), the National Environmental 
                                                 
171 Sierra Club v. Morton  405 U. S. 741, 742 (1972). 
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Protection Act (NEPA), and the Administrative Procedure Act. 172  The Cetacean Community 
was the name given to the world’s whales, porpoises, and dolphins, and was the only plaintiff in 
the case.  The court then reconciled its decision with a decision it had made 15 years previous in 
Palila v. Hawaii Department of Natural Resources (1989) in which the court held that the 
actions of the defendant were indeed a taking of the Palila.173  The Palila, an endangered bird 
located only in a small area in Hawaii, was listed as the first plaintiff and was followed by the 
Sierra Club and others.  The 9th Circuit wrote that the Palila “has legal status and wings its way 
into federal court as a plaintiff of its own right.”174  The court in Cetacean Community called 
their previous statements “little more than rhetorical flourishes.”175  Furthermore, the court 
noted, immediately after they named the Palila as a “plaintiff in its own right,” the 1989 court 
wrote that “the Sierra Club and others brought action under the [ESA] on behalf of the Palila.”176  
Had the 9th circuit employed the Supreme Court’s Lujan criteria, it is doubtful that the court 
would have found that the Sierra Club had standing, for the club never testified as to how it was 
injured.  In this instance, standing for the species would have been more successful in bringing 
the case before the court.  It is presumable that the Supreme Court would not recognize a species 
or valley as a plaintiff in its own right.  Although the 9th Circuit Court held that a species did not 
have standing under the statutes it examined, it articulated that Congress had the authority to 
confer standing upon species if it so decided.  The Court wrote, “We see no reason why Article 
                                                 
172 Cetacean Community v. Bush 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004). 
173 Palila v. Department of Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988) 
174 Cetacean Community v. Bush 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004). 
175 Cetacean Community v. Bush 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004). 
176 Cetacean Community v. Bush 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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III prevents Congress from authorizing a suit in the name of an animal.”177  The court simply 
concludes that Congress had not done so, but that Congress could grant standing if it so chose.   
5.3 CONCLUSION 
This paper has demonstrated that the very intergenerational and public nature of 
environmental goods makes EPGs both important and difficult to provide.  I have proposed 
several methods to increase the ability of citizens to hold government agencies accountable to the 
provision of statutorily protected environmental public goods.  This paper has specifically 
focused on American government as a provider of goods, but some environmental problems are 
international.  Significantly, standing around climate change issues is not as easily solved as 
around Mineral King.     
Alkuin Kölliker has explained that countries are more likely to protect environmental 
goods for which the benefits are excludable to that country.178  This type of internationally 
excludable good, or club good, would include soil stability or non-border rivers and lakes, or the 
Palila.  Consider the protection of the Mississippi River.  If the United States does not act to 
protect the Mississippi, no other nation will.  There is therefore no chance for the US to benefit 
from a clean Mississippi without acting.   
This is not true for all international environmental goods, such as a stable climate.  
Climate protection is an international public good, dependent upon international collective action 
for its provision.  Recall that EPA argued that their regulation of greenhouse gases would 
                                                 
177 Cetacean Community v. Bush 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004). 
178 Alkuin Koelliker, “Globalisation and National Incentives for Protecting Environmental Public Goods” 66. 
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undermine the president’s foreign policy goals because it would remove a bargaining tool to 
convince other nations to act collectively.  The United States government has little incentive to 
protect a stable climate if other countries can simply free-ride –in other words, if other countries 
can benefit from US efforts without having to do anything on their part.  All countries (especially 
the United States) must act collectively to prevent climate change.  Furthermore, the regulation 
of greenhouse gases affects trade profits and further undermines US incentive to autonomously 
regulating greenhouse gases.179  The combination of the public goods nature of climate 
protection and the expensive negative effects on trade make the collective action problem 
surrounding climate protection severe.180 
This paper has focused on ways in which groups become involved in the policy process 
to ensure the provision of intergenerational EPGs.  This conclusion has presented several ways in 
which Congress could alter environmental statutes to enable groups to bring suit.  Citizen suits 
are but one method for groups to become involved.  It is thus likely that those groups which have 
been denied standing would focus their efforts on changing Congressional consideration of 
injury so that they can again seek legal review of agency actions.  In this way, groups serve as 
external mechanisms in all branches of government to ensure that trees remain standing. 
                                                 
179 Alkuin Koelliker, “Globalisation and National Incentives for Protecting Environmental Public Goods” 67. 
180 Ibid., 73. 
See Robert A. Weinstock, “The Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the Provision of Public Goods” Columbia Law 
Review (2009) 109, in which he argues that the “semi-sovereignty” of a state offers a mechanism to develop 
standing.  This suggestion is however limited by the volume of cases a state could bring.    
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